internal weakness within the Government and an election handicap. This was almost unanimously admitted on both sides, while the adverse report of Judge Galt on Hon. Robert Rogers' connections with government contracts in Manitoba was honey to the Opposition bears. Of these two ministers Foster asserted: "Both have been loads to carry-neither should have been made minister-for both the party has paid and will pay dearly. "7 The increasing failure of recruiting and the dismal flop of two substitute measures, national service and the semi-active militia, served to increase a general lack of confidence. The Prime Minister was accused of weakness, inaction, and vacillation; "a well meaning incompetent "s Dafoe dubbed him, while a member of the cabinet repeatedly denounced his policy of "drift-corroding drift?
The Conservative who looked at the political scene would then turn anxiously to the calendar. The life of Parliament would expire on October 7, 1917, and the belligerent Opposition were not likely to grant another extension. With six months left, Dafoe predicted: "Their defeat when they appeal to the people appears inevitable, unless some new factor enters into the contest and gives them a good battle cry. "•ø The miracle happened. Six months later, a new factor gave Borden and his party not only a great battle cry but a large maiority in the election. The Liberal Opposition so strong in January was pitifully weak in December, its leader had offered to resign, and a maiority of its outstanding members had left the party or refused it their support. Strong provincial or local Liberal organizations had melted away or deserted intact to the enemy. In 1916 the Liberal party in Saskatchewan had a well-oiled party machine. Its engineer, Hon. I. A. Calder, boasted: "... our people are but awaiting the fray. The general federal election cannot be brought on too soon to please our people. "n A year later, almost to the day, a lone Saskatchewan Liberal appealed for help: "So far as organization goes Calder is the whole thing and his going . . . has left us high and •2Ibid., Knowles to Lauder, Nov. 6, 1917.
•albid., Nov. 24, 1917. his political army over to the Government. In Nova Scotia the astute provincial Premier-Prime Minister five years longer than Mackenzie King-had considered an offer to enter the Union cabinet and had promised to back 'Government candidates in his province. Laurier lamented his lost follower "whose judgment is so clear and whose sagacity was never at fault. "•4 Fielding, the old veteran, the crown prince of the Liberal party, was bewailed in biblical language? In Ontario the provincial Liberal leader was one of the first to join the Borden cabinet, and more ill news soon reached Laurier: "Yesterday it was Pardee and today it will be Graham. The ditching of Sam Hughes and Bob Rogers, the last-minute adoption of a mild form of income tax, the slight boosting of an inadequate profits tax; the appointment of a vigorous food controller, though with but limited powers, the admission of wheat and flour tariff-free into the United States, and the fixing of wheat prices at over two dollars a bushel, all helped. The nefarious War Times Election Act also increased the votes for the Government and denied votes to the Opposition. But conscription was the big issue; it acted as a solvent on Liberal party bonds while it brought together an amazing array of political talent in the Union Government. It was the dominant issue before the electors at the polls. In all the provinces of Canada this issue was sentimentalized and exaggerated; it was screamed from the hustings and thundered from the pulpits. Those against it were "cowards and traitors" and those for were x4Ibid., Laurier to E. M. Macdonald, Nov. 19, 1917.
•sI-I. S. of these casualties, or about 80 per cent of the wounded, could be expected to return to the trenches eventually, but the loss of men still exceeded the gain by over 7,000. Normal infantry reinforcement requirements were 7,800 per month. 24 At the rate of the 1917 spring enlistment it would take more than four months' enlistment to make up one normal month's loss-and enlistment had not yet reached its lowest point. These were the figures as they appeared at the time conscription was introduced. In actua'l fact the existing reinforcements together with the reduced voluntary enlistments were adequate for a year; a year that had, however, much lighter casualties than were expected. In the meantime the High Command was presenting to the Imperial War Cabinet its urgent requirement for more troops. Borden, Perley, and Kemp, the ministers most closely connected with Canadian military decisions, saw what a strenuous effort the other allies were putting forth; they saw the great need for men at the front but they could not, under the circumstances, commit Canada to the sending of a fifth division. Instead they set themselves the goal of enlisting another 100,000 men. Whether these men could be used to fill out the fifth division or whether they would have to be used entirely in reinforcing the four divisions would depend on military factors and on the speed of enlistment. The need was great and the men were available. How could they be best mobilized?
It would appear that by the spring of 1917 the Canadian Government had exhausted the potentialities of voluntary recruiting. In the first three years of war the Government and the Militia Department had made many mistakes, some of them gross errors in tact and common sense. The greatest offender was the Minister of Militia, but the rest of the cabinet and especially the Prime Minister must share the blame. They had antagonized over-sensitive Quebec; they had authorized the recruiting of units and then broken them up; they had commissioned too many officers and lacked the courage to put them to work or discharge them; they had failed to recruit wealth as they recruited manpower and they had not stopped profit- Measures had to be adopted to check this trend. Drastic solutions were suggested and tried. A semi-active militia force was to replace all soldiers in Canada who were willing to go overseas; a board of national service directors was appointed to advise the Government and local authorities on recruiting matters and stimulate enlistment in all parts of Canada. An Order in Council was passed prohibiting all male persons between the ages of 18 and 45 from leaving Canada subject to regulations. An income tax was introduced and profit taxes were slightly increased. The formation of a French-Canadian brigade was given serious consideration-two years too ]ate. MajorGeneral Lessard and Colonel Blondin were sent to work up a recruiting campaign in Quebec, while members of the cabinet toured other parts of Canada in the interests of recruiting. Distinguished French veterans were sent from France to help the campaign in Quebec; and the help of the Catholic clergy from France was offered and accepted. But enlistments dropped to 3,000 in August, 1917. This was not enough to keep even two divisions in the field. The obvious answer to this manpower problem was conscription. Almost every country was using it and using it effectively. Selective conscription they found to be more efficient and more just than voluntary recruiting.
It would appear, then, that the consequent Military Service Act could have played a dual role in the Government's plans; it did help to win an election and it was also required as a most necessary spur to the war effort. Probably both of these roles were incentives to its adoption, but it is quite evident that the political potential of this move, if it was actually recognized, was vastly underrated. In fact, when the Conservatives introduced the Military Service Bill they were not at all certain that it would get the support of the majority of the country. They were afraid to trust it to a referendum, for they saw what had happened in Australia. The restrictive franchise laws are probably the best indication of the 'Government's lack of confidence in conscription as a vote-getter. Of course, once the election campaign was well under way there was little doubt on either side There seems to be no proof, in short, that the leaders of the Conservative party saw conscription as a political expedient, while there is some evidence to show that the Military Service Act was introduced with fear as to its political effect. It is difficult to believe, however, that the Government was so far out of touch with popular feeling that it introduced the Act without at least a strong hope that the measure would improve the political outlook.
Quite apart from its possible implications for the Conservative party the passing of conscription seemed to be fraught with serious consequences to the country. Apparently the most serious danger was that conscription would cause a grave rift b•twe•n Quebec and the rest of Canada. Conscription was opposed by a large group in Canada. Their argmnent that the Government had mismanaged recruiting and other military matters was undoubtedly sound, but this would not help to rectify the current serious crisis. They also maintained that conscription would split the country and that a divided country could not put forward as great an effort as a united country. This was one of the most prevalent but also one of the Despite the variety of evidence, the intensity of feeling among English-speaking Canadians on conscription has been generally disregarded by historians. One reason for this is that the Englishspeaking provinces were not united on the deskability of conscription whereas Quebec showed a solid front against it. Another In any case, the monthly enlistment was raised from 4,500 in December, 1917, to over 19,000 in January, 1918, while the average enlistment for the first eight months of 1918, until the war had been virtually won, was over 18,000 a month, whereas the average monthly enlistment during 1917 had been less than 6,000. The total enlistment in the C.E.F., both draftees and volunteers, for the period the Act was in force to the end of the war was 156,0187 Plainly, the Military Service Act was not a failure and it was not ineffective, even though the administration of it was inefficient.
In this last respect, it proposed to fulfil its original purpose of enlisting 100,000 men by calling up selected groups as they were required. The Act divided the manhood of Canada into six classes. Class 1, to be called first, included single men age 20 to 34; these were over 400,000 in number. But the exemptions were too generous and too vague: "ff it is in the national interest" was the phrase used in the Act to iustify exemption. Well might an Opposition member exclaim: "By this act all may be called, and by this act all may be exempted. "4ø The exemption clause was manipulated somewhat obviously for election purposes. On December 3, 1917, ten days before the election, the Government exempted all farmers from compulsory enlistment. This gave the farmers an idle were cancelled. Moreover, while the Act became law on August 29, 1917, the first men were not called until October 1•3, and they were not called to report until January, 1918. Undoubtedly there must be administrative lapses, but this particular lapse was not entirely in tone with the Govermnent's grim picture of the existing crisis.
The Military Service Act, however, was to produce manpower not only for immediate reinforcements but also for the big allied effort which was envisaged, and which like the Normandy invasion of 1944 turned out to be not as costly as forecast. Accordingly, as late as September, 1918, Borden warned Lloyd George about the commitment of these reserves: "Having regard to policy practically settled before my departure as to conserving troops for decisive offensive next year I conclude that different policy has been adopted. Conscription in 1917-18 was one of the big issues of Canadian political life, and it continues to reappear at intervals, its advocates parading its economy, its efficiency, and its iustice. But the politician shudders at its appearance and quickly turus his back. If he were induced to discuss it, he would probably admit that in the First World War conscription proved a very successful short-term political device, though its success was not foreseen. He would also have to admit that Canada's war effort, especially in manpower, compared unfavourably with that of the other maior allies and with the efforts of the other Dominions; that voluntary recruiting for various reasons was dead while conscription was undoubtedly the most sensible as well as the most expedient substitute; and that Canada was fighting a war which would certainly have been lost in the spring of 1918 if other countries had followed Canada's tardy example. He probably would require some convincing that conscription did little to aggravate an existing schism; that it aired a festering issue and perhaps prevented a more serious breach. And he would then conclude: "Let's forget it. It's bad business." 
